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Technical Problems
With all the attention placed on BlackBerry in the last month, it is easy to overlook a fundamental question; why is all this negative attention placed on BlackBerry devices and not Apple or Android phones? The answer lies in the way BlackBerry handles email and messaging technologies. On an iPhone or Android phone, all information, including email and messaging, is sent through regular internet channels. These applications are as secure or insecure as regular internet traffic. It is relatively easy for governments to intercept typical internet communications. The reason that BlackBerry is different, and faces so much scrutiny, is that they have established their own encrypted network to handle email and messaging data.
When a BlackBerry user sends an email, it is encrypted using a private key and sent through a BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES) with a corresponding key.
Even if a third party were to intercept the message, they would have to spend considerable time and resources to crack the encryption. There are two types of BES, those owned by RIM, and those owned by private businesses. Herein lies the problem for RIM; even if they wanted to, they would be unable to provide governments with any user's encryption key. If a user connects through a privately owned BES, RIM doesn't have access to the hardware, and if the BES is owned by RIM, they still do not know which encryption key the client is using.
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Even if a third party were to intercept the message, they would have to spend considerable time and resources to crack the encryption. |
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to be gleaned by all handset manufacturers or service providers who shy away from standardized or fully web-based computing in favor of proprietary networks. Security is ensured, but at what cost?
Perception is Reality
Several deadlines for Blackberry have already passed. Saudi Arabia let their August 10th deadline expire without taking action, and just recently, India has granted a 60-day stay while the India telecommunications department tests a proposed monitoring system. But individual victories do not address the biggest problem for RIM going forward: public perception. They claim that they cannot provide access to encrypted data, but Middle Eastern governments insist that RIM colludes with Western powers. RIM states that they have not bowed to foreign pressure, but Saudi Arabia and India tout their successes in receiving concessions.
If RIM does not meet government demands, they may be shut down in some countries; if RIM does meet government demands, they may lose the faith of their customers. In the stock market, an entity operating almost entirely on public perception, RIM has lost more than 20% of its value in a month.
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RIM has attempted to clarify their position, from a technical standpoint, saying “RIM does not possess a 'master key,' nor does any 'back door' exist in the system that would allow RIM or any third party, under any circumstances, to gain access to encrypted corporate information … All data remains encrypted at all times and through all points of transfer between the customer's BlackBerry Enterprise Server and the customer's device (at no point in the transfer is data decrypted and re-encrypted).”
This raises an interesting point, from a lawful intercept perspective. If RIM’s method for handling data is problematic, perhaps there is a wider message
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It is an unsettling reality that BlackBerry may be brought low by being unable to fulfill requests that they do not wish to honor anyways.
Furthermore, the case sheds light on the complexity faced by handset manufacturers and communications service providers operating globally. Lawful intercept is one facet that must be considered, but everything from billing regulations to local marketing preferences must become key considerations for growing companies.
RIM is now learning these tough lessons as they are forced to simultaneously think globally and act locally.
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